HKU Bulletin February 2013 (Vol. 14 No. 2)

Cover Story Tactical propaganda can help to prolong the Chinese Communist Party’s regime through selective reporting about corruption cases. O P  Œ R Ž T Y U V U Y U When Grapevine News Meets the State Media People in Mainland China who learn about local corruption through gossip and rumours consider the problem to be much worse than those who get their news from the mainstream media. But government propaganda is proving effective at counteracting the effect. the fact media outlets are exposing problems has given them credibility among readers. “However, when it comes to very serious issues, the press is still controlled. We rarely see reports about very high-level officials and when we do, they are about those who really failed in the power competition, such as disgraced former Chongqing party secretary and Politburo member Bo Xilai,” she says. Reports of such cases must adhere to a standardised line developed by the government propaganda department. A positive slant on corruption “The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is very good at framing the reporting of corruption. It gives the impression that this is a personal problem of the official, that the Party doesn’t have an institutional problem and that the case shows how sincere they are to tackle corruption.” “Corruption itself is negative but the government tries to frame it in a positive way. This explains why people who only get their information from the government media think corruption is not serious, or think it’s less severe than people who only get it from grapevine news.” When people have access to both sources, the official accounts tend to blunt the effect of to seek information from unofficial sources such as grapevine rumours and gossip. These sources often provide information that their regime does not want to be circulated but they also tend to exaggerate the reality of an issue.” “On the other hand, in China those who only get their information from formal sources such as newspapers tend to have a less severe perception of corruption. The coexistence of controlled mass media and grapevine news therefore generates some complex but fascinating dynamics in shaping people’s perceptions of corruption.” Perception versus reality Corruption in China can include economic crimes such as graft and bribery, official wrongdoing such as torture or shirking of duties, and individual behaviour by officials indicative of moral decay such as having a mistress. Dr Zhu and her colleagues correlated media reports of such cases with the ABSI survey and found that while perceptions of corruption were stronger among people who relied on grapevine news versus formal media outlets, in both cases these perceptions were not affected by the actual number of corruption cases reported in the media. The results suggest a challenge for the Chinese government to overcome the power of the grapevine and it has risen to the task with some success. The liberalisation of the media over the past two decades has had the paradoxical effect of potentially dampening the grapevine effect. While the media has helped to bring corruption to light – particularly local government corruption and issues of concern to the national government such as food safety – it has also framed the most serious cases to suit the Communist Party’s ends. At the same time, : 5  5 @ ; 6 ; b 8 9 ? : 5 K 5 7 M 8 < 5 H 6 I 5 9 A 7 ? A 9 9 e 7 ‰ e Corruption is an undermining force in any society. It diminishes people’s trust in their government and can even threaten the legitimacy of a regime. Yet surveys have found that while corruption is perceived as a major problem in such places as China, Mexico and Russia, relatively few people have direct experience of it. What, then, is influencing public opinion? Dr Zhu Jiangnan, Assistant Professor of Politics and Public Administration, and her colleagues have been studying the case in China, focusing on the 2002 Asian Barometer Survey I (ABSI) of more than 3,000 residents that found nearly 40 per cent thought corruption in local governments was serious but only about 20 per cent had personal experience of it. One of the reasons for the discrepancy was the source of information. “In societies without a guaranteed free flow of information,” says Dr Zhu, “people tend grapevine news. “This finding shows tactical propaganda can help to prolong the CCP’s regime through selective reporting about corruption cases.” An iron fist may backfire Dr Zhu argues this approach may be more effective than iron-tight control of the media, such as seen in North Korea, because just one instance of corruption there could seriously undermine faith in the government. A separate study she did on happiness found people in environments perceived as less corrupt were made more unhappy by an instance of corruption than those living in environments seen as corrupt. Overall, the research points to the benefits of a freer press, despite the downside of negative reporting that tends to happen in places like the United States. “In the long run [a freer press] can increase the resilience of these regimes. When people are better trained with democracy, they are also better able to tell what the reality is when they read about corruption or scandals – they can tell when it is not systematic.” Dr Zhu is hoping to extend the research to the internet and social media, which have a lot of similarities with grapevine news and which have come under tighter government control in recent years. M ;LQKXD 1HZV WKH RI¿FLDO SUHVV DJHQF\ RI WKH 3HRSOH V 5HSXEOLF RI &KLQD LV RQH RI WKH IRUPDO VRXUFHV ZKHUH SHRSOH REWDLQ LQIRUPDWLRQ ,I FRUUXSWLRQ RU VFDQGDOV DUH ¿OWHUHG LWV UHDGHUV KDYH D OHVV VHYHUH SHUFHSWLRQ RI WKH UHDO VLWXDWLRQ LQ &KLQD D ; ? : ? : 5 N ; I 5 7 < 9 5 A I 8 = ? 5 M : 6 8 K 8 L e h < 5 8 < K 5 ; 6 ƒ A ; 6 K A 6 I 4 : ; 6 A M A 6 6 8 N 5 A 7 ; K e L 5 ? L 9 A < 5 J ; 6 5 6 5 N 7 = 9 8 @ 7 8 H 9 M 5 7 8 ? : 5 9 ? : A 6 @ A ; 6 7 ? 9 5 A @ @ 5 I ; A H 7 ; 6 L 7 @ A 9 ? < : 8 6 5 7 8 9 ? A E K 5 ? 7 l 17 Feburary 2013 The University of Hong Kong Bulletin