In July this year, Zhou Yongkang – former Security Chief and member of the Politburo Standing Committee – became the most senior party member to be snared in Party Secretary-General Xi Jinping’s clampdown on corruption. Xi has cast his net wide, targeting all levels of government down to local officials who hold lavish banquets. Even the military, which was sidestepped by Xi’s predecessors, is on his hit list. To Dr Zhu Jiangnan, who has been studying the role of corruption in Chinese politics, these actions speak much louder than their stated aims against malfeasance.

“Xi is showing he can mobilise different departments in government to help implement his policies. In China, the capacity to mobilise officials in different sectors doesn’t only rely on the formal title of Party Secretary-General. You also need a lot of factional network support. It’s especially useful for him at this moment to signal his power base and prevent challenges from other politicians,” she said.

Xi’s actions are a pertinent example of the political realities of authoritarian regimes. Unlike democracies, which have regular elections and freedom of the press, leaders in authoritarian regimes do not have any reliable means of testing and building loyalty. Both corruption and anti-corruption efforts arise as an alternative.

Photo Former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang, one of the most powerful leaders in China, has been under investigation for the abuse of power and corruption since late 2013.
Courtesy of Getty Images

Dr Zhu has been looking at the mechanisms and patterns behind what she calls the ‘politicising of political persecution’ and the role of factions in determining who to target. While factionalism and politically motivated persecutions exist in democracies too, they play out quite differently in a place like China.

“Often authoritarian leaders also tend to tolerate corruption by local leaders because it’s a way to buy off their loyalty. The question is, how do you draw the line? Factional identity helps officials to make this decision.”

Often authoritarian leaders also tend to tolerate corruption by local leaders because it’s a way to buy off their loyalty. The question is, how do you draw the line?

Dr Zhu Jiangnan
Weakening opposition

Dr Zhu has used available data to trace the factional ties (such as birthplace, university and work experience) between senior officials investigated for corruption between 1980 and 2012 and national leaders, and the timing of corruption clampdowns.

“We find that anti-corruption drives usually start during a power transition. It’s understandable that officials don’t have much incentive to go after corruption right under their administration as they would only embarrass themselves for promoting corrupt people. There is more incentive to go after corruption under their predecessor to weaken their power, especially if he is part of a strong faction that is a political threat.

“Ultimately the case of Bo Xilai [who was jailed last year for corruption and abuse of power] and the current campaigns are probably motivated by factional fighting.” Bo was an ally of Zhou and both men came under the orbit of China’s former leader Jiang Zemin. Bo also targeted his predecessor’s allies when he was Communist Party Secretary of Chongqing, although this ultimately led to his downfall.

Photo Former Chongqing Communist Party leader Bo Xilai, who was found guilty on all charges, was sentenced to life in prison for bribery, abuse of power and embezzlement.
Courtesy of Getty Images
‘Tributes’ from the private sector

Dr Zhu has also been looking at the private sector’s entanglement in official corruption, although this has more to do with currying favours than power plays. For example, companies often pay ‘irregular fees’ to government officials beyond taxes and other typical charges – something she likens to the tributes paid to emperors in the past.

“Sometimes they are not bribes but favours – the private entrepreneurs entertain officials, invite them to banquets or karaoke, or give them expensive sports memberships. This is a grey area, it may be counted as a bribe or corruption, but a lot of them may see this as showing goodness to the officials. So we use this word ‘tribute’,” she said.

Using data from a survey of private entrepreneurs, she found the real estate, mining, agriculture and construction sectors paid the most ‘irregular fees’ – and, incidentally, were the most dependent on government support in terms of land grants, approvals and certifications.

Another form of exploitation is something Dr Zhu calls ‘organisational clientelism’, in which entrepreneurs are appointed to the local party congress or political consultative committee. At first glance this would seem to be a perk, but it often results in requests to fund banquets, roads and other projects, and it can be difficult to withdraw from these posts, she said.

Dr Zhu hopes her work will help to develop corruption studies beyond the sensation of media coverage. “Corruption is really hard to theorise. I’m trying to link it to the general logic of authoritarian regimes to find more causal relations and mechanisms behind what is going on in China,” she said.